Some Suggestions for Future Budget Cuts

As I wrote yesterday, I think the government shutdown is stupid. But so long as people are listing things that are no longer operating (that, it follows,we usually pay for), let's see if we can find some things we fund that we can all agree are a giant waste of time and money.

Government social media presence--Twitter, Instagram, etc. Why on God's earth do we pay people to update the First Lady's Twitter account or the White House Instagram feed? I'm sure the WH has a staff photog--and they should for history's sake, I think--but real time updates of what is going on in the Oval Office is no more useful than the pic of what my friends had for brunch on Sunday. At best it's useless, at worst it's propaganda. Chuck them.

The DEA: Seriously, they are worthless. Drugs are cheaper and purer than they've been at any point over the last 20 years. Billions of dollars absolutely and unquestionably wasted, not to mention the lives ruined and lost in the process. Kill it.

E-Verify: Doesn't work, costs a lot of money, is a blatant privacy violation, and is going to cost jobs when false positives reject American citizens from jobs for which they are eligible. This last bit will be due to some administrative snafu, which comes standard with any government program. We don't need a national ID.

Child Soldier Subsidies: No, really. Congress passed a law in 2008 banning financial and military support to regimes that actively use child soldiers. The White House just waived that ban for three countries that use child soldiers on Friday. Here, for once, it's perfectly reasonable to say "THINK OF THE CHILDREN!!!"

There are plenty more, but even the most strident good government type has to admit we spend too much money on government that ranges from banal to deplorable. Surely we can cut some of this.

bellum medicamenti delenda est

Why the Feds Are Unlikely to Respect Washington and Colorado

The recent ballot initiatives that allow recreational cannabis use in Colorado and Washington have been welcomed by many folks as a sweeping change in American drug policy. To the extent that the initiatives represent a shift in popular conception of cannabis use, I join the general enthusiasm expressed by libertarians and a several on the Left. However, the Obama Administration has shown no substantive will to rein in the federal Drug War and until it does, these measures can only be viewed as partial victories in those two states. Moreover, many supportive commentators seem overly optimistic of what is likely to happen, perhaps based on misplaced assumptions of how the Drug War is fought.

Quoting Mark Kleiman, co-author of Marijuana Legalization: What Everyone Needs to Know, MoJo's Kevin Drum writes:

[Kleiman:]The federal government could shut down both of those experiments, if it were determined to do so....But it would make it impossible to learn anything useful from the Colorado and Washington experiments.

So why shouldn’t the federal government cut Colorado and Washington some slack? As long as those states prevent marijuana grown under their laws from crossing state lines and thereby subverting marijuana prohibition in the rest of the states, the Justice Department could step back and let the consequences of the new policies play themselves out. They might succeed, or they might fail. In either case, the rest of us could learn from their experience.

I doubt that either state can effectively prevent locally-grown marijuana from crossing state lines, but hell, they can't prevent it now either. So I'm with Mark: there's no need to announce any public change of policy, but Obama should tell DEA to lie low for a while and see how Colorado and Washington do. A controlled experiment like this is the best way of finding out the effect of full legalization of marijuana. Does it lead to higher consumption? Is it a gateway drug? Will it reduce consumption of alcohol? (emphasis mine)

There are three main problems with this excerpt. 

 

First, Professor Kleiman's question rests on the assumption that the federal government has any desire to see how the “experiments” play out. As I've noted before, the DEA effectively prohibits experimental research on cannabis in a controlled environment by anyone but the National Institute on Drug Abuse, a government agency. Cannabis, as explained in Kleiman's book, is the only illicit drug that is off-limits to non-governmental researchers that are open to positive value in cannabis use. There is no reason to believe that while the DEA won't allow literal experiments by scientists in a lab, they would be amenable to whole states being substituted as figurative laboratories. As a drug researcher, he knows this, but this sort of 'why not?' obscures the hurdles the government  institutes to hamper the “science” the ONDCP is so fond of citing to support their policies.

Second, Drum assumes that cannabis would need to cross state lines to violate the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution to enter the federal jurisdiction—a perfectly reasonable belief. Unfortunately, this is not how the Supreme Court has ruled...twice. In Wickard v. Filburn (1942), the New Deal Court ruled that a farmer who set aside wheat for his own family's use could be regulated—read, “prohibited”—by the federal government of the Interstate Commerce Clause. More recently, in Gonzales v. Raich (2004), the Court ruled—with Republican-appointed Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist and Thomas dissenting—that cannabis grown by a terminally ill individual in accordance with state law for one's own medical use violated that very same Interstate Commerce Clause because by not participating in a (prohibited) interstate market, you affect demand. Not coincidentally, this tortured reading of the clause was cited in just nearly (if not) every single brief supporting the government in the Health Care Cases (2012). In short, much of the Left's economic and legal agenda rides on the federal government asserting power, via the Commerce Clause, into any aspect of our economic and personal lives. That Obama's Administration would find a new respect for federalism for cannabis is laughable...literally.

Third, and perhaps most important, it's not only the DEA that needs to stand-down. The U.S. Attorneys in every federal jurisdiction in the country have very wide latitude on whom they prosecute and for what offense. As you may recall, early in the Obama Administration, Attorney General Holder said publicly, backed-up by what is known as the “Ogden Memo,” that the DOJ would no longer consider raiding medical cannabis facilities that complied with state law a priority. Since then, the DOJ has increased raids on those same facilities, sometimes with the help of municipal authorities who don't agree with state law. If a public directive is so willfully ignored, there's little to suggest private encouragement would meet a different fate, particularly in the Eastern District of Washington.

Matt Yglesias, in a post that has a much more realistic view of the new regime, still errs a bit:

“The DEA obviously can't police low-level retailing, so if states and localities say it's legal it'll be a lot simpler in practice to get some pot.”

On the facts of the matter, Matt is correct. There will be no DEA patrols going through neighborhoods looking for cannabis. That said, it has been and continues to be very easy to “get some pot” all across America. Most cannabis users (and dealers, for that matter) simply aren't caught. The Drug War isn't a failure because you can still get some drugs under some circumstances—the failure lies, in part, in the fact drugs are still virtually ubiquitous despite draconian enforcement efforts. Further, the feds are not above using relatively low-level stings to get convictions—they know most offenders are going to plea out. Indeed, they don't even need to charge anyone at all to intimidate a low-level user ignorant of federal law into cooperation. Then, all they need is an inside-lead to a small group of people who have a common connection to drugs—say a commune or even a co-op—and prosecutors may attach the word “conspiracy” to add the cannabis together to reach federally chargable amounts. If any of those people have otherwise legal and unrelated guns on the premises, the charges really start to mount up. A small dispensary or a self-sustaining bunch of hippies can become a target of an ambitious U.S. Attorney—and it's all over. Though hypothetical, it's not at all unreasonable to think this sort of thing will happen—the track record against medical cannabis facilities proves that. I'm sure the DOJ has its stable of confidential informants ready and willing to work under new rules.

So I join Yglesias and Drum with a cautious optimism that this will make life better for cannabis users in Colorado and Washington. But we should not fail to mention that this will not deter federal law enforcement from prosecuting state-legal activity. That enforcement, though less harassing to the general public than state and municipal policing, will continue to ruin lives through incarceration and depriving the sick of relief. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the Administration that continues to deprive cancer and AIDS patients regular access to their medicine suddenly changing its tune now that Dave-O can load up his stash before a Phish show. If anything, I would expect heightened federal action against participants in the new regimes not long after they are put in place.

bellum medicamenti delenda est

The Government's Addiction

Charlie Savage reports that the DEA is ramping up its militarization efforts around Latin America:

The D.E.A. now has five commando-style squads it has been quietly deploying for the past several years to Western Hemisphere nations — including Haiti, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Belize — that are battling drug cartels, according to documents and interviews with law enforcement officials.

The program — called FAST, for Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team — was created during the George W. Bush administration to investigate Taliban-linked drug traffickers in Afghanistan. Beginning in 2008 and continuing under President Obama, it has expanded far beyond the war zone.


“You have got to have special skills and equipment to be able to operate effectively and safely in environments like this,” said Michael A. Braun, a former head of operations for the drug agency who helped design the program. “The D.E.A. is working shoulder-to-shoulder in harm’s way with host-nation counterparts.”

 The DEA has hit-teams now. What could possibly go wrong?

“It could lead to a nationalist backlash in the countries involved,” [University of Miami professor Bruce Bagley] said. “If an American is killed, the administration and the D.E.A. could get mired in Congressional oversight hearings. Taking out kingpins could fragment the organization and lead to more violence. And it won’t permanently stop trafficking unless a country also has capable institutions, which often don’t exist in Central America.”(emphasis mine)

In short, the Obama administration's answer to the Drug War is to get more violent and put more agents in harm's way, the benefit of which will be...more violence. It's not like this hasn't been tried before:

The FAST program is similar to a D.E.A. operation in the late 1980s and early 1990s in which drug enforcement agents received military training and entered into partnerships with local forces in places like Peru and Bolivia, targeting smuggling airstrips and jungle labs.


The Reagan-era initiative, though, drew criticism from agency supervisors who disliked the disruption of supplying agents for temporary rotations, and questioned whether its benefits outweighed the risks and cost. The Clinton administration was moving to shut down the operation when five agents died in a plane crash in Peru in 1994, sealing its fate.

Best case scenario: country A sees a wave of US-backed military raids and violence. This country restores its "capable institutions" and  after countless firefights with law enforcement and one another, leaving scores of innocents dead, the resident drug operation finds more fertile ground to operate in country B, which lacks similar capable institutions. America still gets its drugs and the bloody fight continues in a new country. This predictable and oft-repeated result is called the "balloon effect."

Like a gambler at a casino who just doesn't know when to quit, the United States continues to double-down on its hopeless efforts to use violence to solve its 'drug problem.' Any objective observer of the situation can clearly see its futility and the consequences of pursuing this course of action. Yet the gambler continues, thinking this time it's gonna work. Any short term gains are completely illusory, but they are used to justify even more of the same.

It's time we start thinking about an intervention.

bellum medicamenti delenda est

The DEA, Charlie Sheen, and Caged Animals

Last week, WaPo ran a story about how the murderous drug cartels in Mexico are now targeting children. As I've noted before, the cartels there are particularly brutal--decapitations, genital mutilation, and mass graves have become standard operating procedure--so that they've moved on to killing children cannot really be all that surprising:

A Chihuahua state police commander was attacked as she carried her 5-year-old daughter to school two weeks ago. Both died of multiple gunshot wounds.

In February, assassins went hunting for a Ciudad Juarez man, but the intended target wasn’t home, so they killed his three daughters instead, ages 12, 14 and 15

In March, a young woman was bound and gagged, shot and left in a car in Acapulco. Her 4-year-old daughter lay slumped beside her, killed with a single bullet to her chest. She was the fifth child killed in drug violence in the resort city in one bloody week.

 Awful, but not surprising.

What was surprising, to me anyway, was the DEA chief's reaction in the story:

“It may seem contradictory, but the unfortunate level of violence is a sign of success in the fight against drugs,” said Michele Leonhart, head of the Drug Enforcement Administration. The cartels “are like caged animals, attacking one another,” she added. (emphasis added)

Tens of thousands of drug war murders in the last four years alone is "success" in a Charlie Sheen sort of way: epic denial of cocaine-fueled violence and humiliating failure, egged-on and financed by self-important sadists who watch from afar.

DEA: Duh, winning.

As for the rhetoric, the cartels aren't caged animals--they are businessmen (and women) who are afforded no property rights. They are rich--Forbes list rich--because drug prohibition makes easily grown plants expensive. Yes, it takes a cold, sociopathic brutality to commit such heinous acts, but history is replete with people of all walks of life committing acts of unspeakable butchery. The animal comparison is unfair to the Mexican people because it depicts them as something different from us--something beneath us--so the horror of their daily lives can be so crassly characterized by the American government as "success."


It makes one wonder who the real "animals" are.


bellum medicamenti delenda est.